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COMMENT
THE JOBS ACT: EFFECTS ON CAPITAL
MARKET COMPETITION IN BOTH PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE MARKETS
TOM WENTZELL*
INTRODUCTION
Nothing has shaped modern culture in the twenty-first century quite
like Facebook, so much so that the influence has even spilled over to the
federal securities laws. In 2012, Facebook became a public company, gen-
erating sixteen billion dollars through an initial public offering (IPO) of its
shares.1 Though now publically owned, much has been made of a sequence
of events that allowed Facebook to remain a private company for a signifi-
cant period of time before its IPO. In late 2010, Goldman Sachs proposed to
sell a large number of Facebook shares to various investors.2 Had the sale
gone through, Facebook stock arguably would have been held by enough
shareholders that Facebook would have been required to register as a public
company under the US securities laws.3 With Facebook not wanting to be
exposed to registration requirements under the US securities laws, Goldman
Sachs brought the transaction outside of the United States.4 To some mem-
bers of the public, and indeed to opportunistic lawmakers, the off-shoring of
this transaction marked a failure of the American economic system’s ability
to stimulate, or even allow for, capital formation.5 American lawmakers
who had so recently witnessed a beefing up of regulatory oversight through
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act, capitalized on the oppor-
* Juris Doctorate, University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2013. Tom Wentzell is cur-
rently an associate at Cousineau McGuire Chartered in St. Louis Park, MN. He would like to
thank Professor Thomas Joyce for his thoughtful feedback and insight during the writing of this
note.
1. Lee Spears & Sarah Frier, Facebook Stalls in Public Debut After Record $16B in IPO,
BLOOMBERG (May 18, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-17/facebook-
raises-16-billion-in-biggest-technology-ipo-on-record.html.
2. Adam C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Har-
nessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2013).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1008.
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tunity to criticize the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and push for
legislation that was deregulatory and more “pro-growth” in nature.6
Critics saw the off-shore Facebook transactions as representative of a
broader trend, in which the United States has gradually become less domi-
nant in its position as the most powerful capital-raising venue in the world.
Over the course of the last twenty years, United States capital markets have
indeed become relatively less competitive, across a variety of metrics.
When the comparison period is narrowed to only the last ten years, it is
even more evident that the United States is not the singular, capital-raising
powerhouse that it was in the last decade of the twentieth century.7 Cer-
tainly, there is a debate as to how much this status matters. If issuers of
securities are attracted to a country’s capital raising environment, but that
environment is deregulated to such an extent that investors are not ade-
quately protected, it is not necessarily a weakness to be “less competitive.”
Investor protection concerns notwithstanding, the trend of fewer foreign
companies bringing their transactions to the United States has not been lost
on lawmakers.
In April of 2012, Congress passed and President Obama signed the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (hereinafter the “JOBS Act” or the
“Act”), in an effort to improve the competitive position of US capital mar-
kets.8 This paper examines certain changes called for by the JOBS Act, and
provides analysis as to whether these changes are likely to improve the
competitive position of US capital markets. The paper looks at those por-
tions of the JOBS Act that were effective immediately upon its passage,
examines related SEC rulemaking on general solicitation and general adver-
tising, and predicts whether the changes established by the JOBS Act will in
fact jumpstart capital formation for early stage companies.
Part I offers a snapshot of the current state of US capital market com-
petitiveness, focusing primarily on data compiled in the last twenty years by
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR). This snapshot of
US markets shows that private capital markets are burgeoning, but public
markets are stagnating—or even regressing—compared to other countries.
Part II highlights policy makers’ responses to the declining competitiveness
of US markets. Their responses exhibit awareness among policy makers
that the depth and liquidity of capital markets has a direct impact on early-
stage companies’ ability to attract investment and grow their businesses.
Such investment allows companies to grow and create jobs, which is cur-
rently a primary concern of lawmakers. Part III offers a description of the
JOBS Act, with a particular emphasis on Titles I, II, and V of the Act. Part
III goes on to analyze the JOBS Act through the specter of whether or not it
6. See id. (stating that “Goldman’s failed private offering of Facebook shares triggered a
rather dramatic legislative response”).
7. See infra Section I.
8. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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is likely to cure any of the deficiencies present in US capital markets, and
what tertiary effects the Act might have as a result of its emphasis on capi-
tal formation.
This paper—for the most part—does not discuss investor protection
issues relevant to the JOBS Act, though the debates on that topic are numer-
ous and provocative. Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley or Dodd-Frank, the primary
focus of the JOBS Act is not investor protection. As outlined below, the
JOBS Act focuses on capital formation, and this paper will primarily ana-
lyze how effective the Act is in promoting that objective. Taking a compre-
hensive view of the JOBS Act, it should moderately improve the
attractiveness of US capital markets overall, but the net benefit to public
markets and the initial public offering market, in particular, is likely to be
negligible, if not nil.
I. THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF US CAPITAL MARKETS
Various theories attempt to explain the trend of decreasing competi-
tiveness in the US capital markets, some of which point directly to the
structures of the US financial system, and others that do not. One scholar,
Stephen Bainbridge from the University of California–Los Angeles, argues
that corporate governance reforms under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Dodd-Frank Act have made operating as a public company in the United
States less appealing.9 Bainbridge asserts that both the primary and secon-
dary public markets have suffered in the wake of the “federalizing” of cor-
porate governance.10 Notwithstanding Bainbridge’s views on causation
factors, his assertion that primary markets (i.e., initial public offerings) and
secondary markets (i.e., the resale markets) are struggling is borne out by
the data provided below.11 This illustrates how the expenses that deter com-
panies from going public in the United States are not only those expenses
related to conducting an IPO, but also those from the continuing reporting
obligations attendant to public company status. Bainbridge argues that it is
not so much the principles of the regulatory rules that are a burden to Amer-
ican public companies, but rather the “sheer volume of regulations with
which issuers must comply.”12
Another scholar, John C. Coffee, Jr., of Columbia University, notes
that the litigation environment in the United States is “likely to discourage
the foreign issuer from entering the U.S. market.”13 Coffee refers to this as
9. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
261–68 (2012) (describing the “federalizing” of corporate governance law through Sarbanes-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank, which has added significant regulatory compliance costs for public
companies).
10. Id. at 261–62.
11. See infra notes 17–30 and accompanying text.
12. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 9, at 264–65.
13. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
229, 302 (2007).
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“private enforcement” in the securities market, and suggests that it makes a
foreign firm less likely to cross-list its shares on a US exchange because
doing so exposes it to potentially global class action lawsuits.14
Foreign developments, however, are also partly responsible for the rel-
ative decrease in the competitiveness of the US capital markets. As foreign
jurisdictions have improved their regulatory policies and legal institutions,
they have encouraged growth in their own markets.15 If a foreign market
improves its capital supply, a foreign firm has a lesser need to come to the
United States to raise capital. Though such growth could be a positive for
the overall health of the US economy,16 it also lessens America’s domi-
nance over, and relative competitive position within, capital markets. Either
way—whether US markets are fundamentally flawed or foreign countries
are more effectively positioning their capital markets than in previous
years—the data show that US capital markets are relatively weaker than
they were before the turn of the century.
Much of the most useful research illustrating the changing landscape
of capital market competition comes from the Committee on Capital Mar-
kets Regulation (CCMR), an independent, non-partisan research organiza-
tion that studies the regulation of US capital markets.17 CCMR maintains an
updated collection of data that tracks various metrics that serve as indicators
of capital market competitiveness. These measures in their entirety paint a
picture of a US financial system that was at its most competitive in the mid-
to late-1990s, but has gradually ceded its dominance starting in the first
decade of the twenty-first century.18
For example, in the year 2000, American stock exchanges accounted
for 63.9% of the total value of share trading worldwide, with respect to
trading on exchanges that are members of the World Federation of Ex-
changes.19 This figure has since dropped steadily, and in 2012, it stood at
47.5%.20 The data also show that between 2002 and 2012, the average an-
nual growth in the gross value of share trading increased by 5.3% on for-
eign exchanges, but only 2.3% on US exchanges.21 So even though the
14. Id. at 302–03.
15. Michael J. Ryan Jr., CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CAPITAL MAR-
KETS COMPETITIVENESS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 31 (2011), available at https://www.us-
chamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/1107_UnfinishedAgenda_WEB.pdf.
16. See id. (explaining that successful foreign markets can bolster the U.S. market by supply-
ing a wider range of goods and services and a lower cost of capital).
17. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS REGULATION, http://capmktsreg.org (last visited June 6, 2013).
18. See generally Competitiveness Measures, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, http://
capmktsreg.org/education-research/competitiveness-measures/ (last visited, June 6, 2013).
19. Measure 11 – U.S. Share of the Value of Global Share Trading, COMM. ON CAPITAL
MKTS. REGULATION, http://capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/11Value_of_Share_Trad-
ing_on_Member_Exchanges_of_the_World_Federation_of_Exchanges_12_4.pdf (last visited
June 6, 2013) (attached to this article as Appendix A).
20. Id.
21. Id.
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global financial crisis was—as inferred by its common parlance—a blow to
financial systems worldwide, these data show in a comparative fashion that
US public markets were more severely set back and have rebounded less
rapidly than foreign public markets.
Another indicator of decreasing competitiveness in the United States is
that its relative share of Global Initial Public Offering (“Global IPOs”) ac-
tivity has decreased significantly.22 “Global IPOs” are defined as “IPOs by
foreign companies outside their home countries.”23 Between 1996 and
2000, the total number of Global IPOs that were captured by US exchanges
in a given year ranged between 46.4% and 58.1%.24 Since then—though the
decline in activity has not been linear—the percentage of Global IPOs cap-
tured by US exchanges since 2001 has ranged between 6.4% and 26.1%.25
With respect to Global IPO activity in terms of total dollar value, America’s
drop has not been quite as precipitous, although it still has been signifi-
cant.26 The lesser decrease, measured in dollar value, indicates that among
the Global IPOs that US markets are still able to attract, a disproportionate
number are large offerings. Global IPOs as a whole, however, are coming to
the United States at a less frequent rate. The fact that smaller companies are
faring proportionately worse than larger companies in this category under-
scores the importance of the JOBS Act’s emphasis on small and emerging
companies.
Finally, to the extent that foreign issuers are raising capital in the
United States, they are doing so more frequently through private markets.
According to the CCMR, the amount of equity raised by foreign issuers
through private Rule 144A American Depository Receipt (ADR) offerings,
taken as a percentage of the amount of capital raised by foreign issuers in
public equity markets, has increased over the last eight years.27 From 2000
to 2004, Rule 144A offerings ranged between 1.0% and 3.5% of the amount
of equity raised through public markets.28 From 2005 to 2012, this number
ranged between 3.8% and 46.8%, and in four of those eight years the per-
centage was in the double-digits.29 Although Rule 144A offerings comprise
22. See generally Equity Raised in Public Markets, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION,
http://capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2Share_of_Global_IPO_12_4_1-of-2.pdf (last
visited June 6, 2013) (defining various measures used to examine performance in capital markets).
23. Id.
24. Measure 2 – Global IPOs by Foreign Companies (Narrowly Defined), COMM. ON CAPI-
TAL MKTS. REGULATION, http://capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2Share_of_Global_
IPO_12_4_1-of-2.pdf (last visited June 6, 2013) (attached to this article as Appendix B).
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Measure 7 – Relative Size of the Private Rule 144A and Public Equity Markets, COMM.
ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, http://capmktsreg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/7Equity_
Raised_by_Foreign_Issuers_Via_Rule_144A_12_4.pdf (last visited June 6, 2013) (attached to this
article as Appendix C).
28. See id.
29. See id.
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only part of the private market, they are an alternative that many foreign
companies use to avoid listing in the United States, and these data show that
the Rule is increasingly being used. Also, the increasing ratios described in
this paragraph are the result of both increased participation in the Rule
144A private market and flat or decreased participation in public equity
markets.30 Thus, the data show more than simply a burgeoning of the pri-
vate equity markets; rather, they truly reflect a weakening of US public
equity markets.
II. THE JOBS ACT RESPONDS TO WEAKNESSES IN US
CAPITAL MARKETS
The decreasing competitiveness of US public capital markets has not
been lost on American policy makers. On December 8, 2011, Representa-
tive Stephen Fincher from Tennessee introduced what would later become
the JOBS Act.31 In his brief opening remarks, Representative Fincher de-
scribed the decrease in US IPO activity, and how this is of concern to the
US economy because “over 90 percent of job growth occurs after a com-
pany goes public.”32 He called American regulation of capital markets a
“one-size-fits-all” approach and showed concern that such regulations im-
posed a “disproportionate cost” on smaller companies, thus making it less
desirable to become public and more onerous for those who already are
public.33 The focus of Representative Fincher’s concerns was clearly on
public markets.
The introductory text of the JOBS Act itself imbues a public market
emphasis. The Act states as its purpose: “To increase American job creation
and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for
emerging growth companies.”34 Similarly, the captions of each Title give
rise to an unmistakable inference of the pro capital formation policy legisla-
tors sought to achieve through the JOBS Act. For example: “Title I—Re-
opening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth Companies,”
“Title II—Access to Capital for Job Creators,” and “Title V—Private Com-
pany Flexibility and Growth.”35 This legislation was put forth to spur capi-
tal markets, and notably, it passed with widespread bipartisan support.36
30. See id.
31. 157 CONG. REC. E2210 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Rep. Stephen Fincher).
32. Id.
33. Id. at E2210–11.
34. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
[hereinafter “JOBS Act”] (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Seung Min Kim, JOBS Act Passes Congress, Heads to Obama, POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2012,
7:19 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74539.html (noting passage in the House
by a margin of 380 to 41, and passage in the Senate by a margin of 73 to 26).
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Representative John Carney was another chief author of the JOBS
Act.37 Representative Carney urged his colleagues to pass the legislation
because it would make it easier and less costly for companies to go pub-
lic.38 He emphasized that the JOBS Act would not grant exemptions for
companies seeking to go public, but rather, it allowed for “phasing in [of]
certain costly regulatory requirements.”39 Though he acknowledged that
there was much debate surrounding certain provisions of the bill, he noted
that the Financial Services Committee passed the bill with a bipartisan vote
of fifty-four to one.40
Even since the passage of the JOBS Act, legislators have reiterated the
importance of the Act’s policies as it goes through the process of rulemak-
ing before the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In a letter to then-
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro regarding implementation of Title II of the
Act, Representative Patrick McHenry referred to the JOBS Act as “critical
reform.”41 McHenry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on TARP, Financial
Services and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs, was dismayed at
Chairman Schapiro’s alleged foot-dragging in putting forth SEC rules, and
complained that the SEC’s delay was a “significant obstacle to capital for-
mation and economic recovery.”42
Certainly the JOBS Act is not without its opponents—particularly
those concerned with investor protection issues related to Title II—but this
paper considers the legislation for its effectiveness in achieving the objec-
tives sought by its proponents and the purpose articulated in its text.43 The
following section explores how the JOBS Act is likely to impact the com-
petitive position of US capital markets, predicting what its effects will be on
both public and private markets. The paper will only examine Titles I, II,
and V of the Act. Title III is the “crowdfunding” exemption which is not yet
effective and will require extensive SEC rule-making.44 Title IV allows
companies to issue to the public, under Regulation A, up to $50 million in
equity, debt, or convertible securities in a year without having to register,
but it also is not addressed in this paper as it too relies on SEC rulemaking
37. Full Biography, U.S. CONGRESSMAN JOHN CARNEY, http://johncarney.house.gov/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=7 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013); see 158
CONG. REC. H1236–37 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus).
38. 158 CONG. REC. H1237–38 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. John Carney).
39. Id. at H1238.
40. Id.
41. Letter from Patrick McHenry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on TARP, Financial Ser-
vices and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs, to Mary Schapiro, SEC Chairman (Nov. 30,
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712.shtml.
42. Id.
43. See JOBS Act, supra note 34.
44. See id. at § 302; see also Information Regarding the Use of the Crowdfunding Exemption
in the JOBS Act, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 23, 2012), http://sec.gov/spotlight/jobsact/crowd
fundingexemption.htm (“reminding” issuers that any crowd-funding before the implementation of
SEC rules is unlawful under the securities laws).
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that has yet to begin as of the summer of 2013.45 Title VI is not discussed
because it relates only to community banks and not to issuers of securities
generally, and Title VII is omitted from this discussion because it is merely
an education and outreach mandate to the SEC.46
III. ANALYZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JOBS ACT IN IMPROVING
US CAPITAL MARKET COMPETITIVENESS
Although the JOBS Act contains certain elements that are keenly
targeted to achieve various (though sometimes competing) objectives, the
Act taken as a whole does not significantly further the goal of making US
capital markets more attractive to foreign companies deciding where to list
their shares. In particular, the Act’s effect on public markets is minimal, as
the greatest improvements from the standpoint of attracting capital will be
in the private markets. Improvements to the IPO process are largely offset
by a company’s ability to access new sources of capital while still remain-
ing private. Thus, though the IPO process has improved, the incentive has
to go public have also decreased.
A. Title I: Reopening American Capital Markets to Emerging Growth
Companies
Title I, or the “IPO on-ramp,” was enacted with the purpose of making
it less burdensome for a smaller issuer to conduct an initial public offering
(IPO), and less burdensome for a smaller issuer to operate as a public com-
pany in the early years after its IPO.47 Title I created a class of issuers
called “Emerging Growth Companies,” (EGCs) which are companies that
have less than $1 billion in annual revenue and less than $700 million in
worldwide market value of equity securities—otherwise known as a com-
pany’s public float.48 A company retains EGC status for as long as it stays
below the thresholds for annual revenue and public float, or until the final
day of the fiscal year following the fifth anniversary of its IPO.49 The other
key defining feature of an EGC is that an issuer is only eligible for EGC
status if its first public sale of securities came after December 8, 2011.50
45. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 401; see also Bob Kaplan & Tom Voekler, Beyond
Crowdfunding: Why Regulation A Reform is the most Vital Piece of the JOBS Act, THE WASH.
POST (June 13, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-13/business/35459353_1_ini-
tial-public-offerings-investors-jobs-act (describing the basic operation of Regulation A).
46. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at §§ 601, 701.
47. See, e.g., Latham & Watkins Capital Markets Group, Client Alert No. 1308: JOBS Act
Establishes IPO On-Ramp, LATHAM & WATKINS (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.lw.com/upload/pub
Content/_pdf/pub4711_1.pdf.
48. JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 101; see also Securities Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12b-2 (2012) (defining worldwide market value requirements for issuers).
49. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at §§ 101(a), (b).
50. Id. at § 101(d).
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Under Title I, the JOBS Act confers numerous benefits on EGCs.
Some of these benefits relate to corporate governance and audits—benefits
an EGC will enjoy after it has already become public. A summary of those
post-IPO benefits is as follows:
• EGCs are not required to hold votes on executive compensa-
tion (“Say-on-Pay”) or on executive golden parachute
compensation.51
• EGCs going public for the first time need only two years of
audited financial statements instead of the three years that is
normally required.52
• EGCs are not required to adhere to any auditor rotation rules
established under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or by the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board.53
• When public companies file annual reports, they are required
to include an “internal control report,” which is a description
and an assessment of the effectiveness of their control struc-
tures related to financial reporting.54 Under section 404 of
Sarbanes-Oxley, the accounting firm that issues this report
must “attest to, and report on” the assessments made by the
management of the issuer. The JOBS Act, however, removes
auditor attestation requirement for EGCs.55
With Title I, the JOBS Act created what some might consider an inter-
mediate status that is more demanding than private company status, but
does not impose the full rigor of the normal public company reporting re-
gime. The benefits conferred by Title I are ongoing for as long as a com-
pany retains Emerging Growth Company status—either until after the five-
year anniversary of the company’s IPO or until it becomes too large, based
on annual revenue and public float.56
Other benefits that EGCs enjoy are specifically related to the initial
public offering of their securities. These benefits include:
• Broker-dealers are allowed to publish research reports regard-
ing EGCs even if the broker-dealer is participating in that
EGC’s public offering. Importantly, these reports will not be
considered offers under the securities laws.57
• Various communications by research analysts are explicitly
permitted, thereby deconstructing the wall between analysts
51. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS: BILL SUMMARY AND
STATUS (Apr. 5, 2012), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR03606:@@@L&
summ2=m&.
52. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 102(b).
53. Id. at § 104.
54. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
55. See id.; see also JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 103.
56. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at §§ 101(a)–(b).
57. Id. at § 105(a).
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and other parties involved in the offering—particularly invest-
ment bankers.58
• EGCs are allowed to submit a draft version of their registra-
tion statements to the SEC for confidential review.59
Additionally, the SEC has indicated that foreign private issuers will be
treated the same under the JOBS Act as domestic issuers, even though the
plain language of the text of the JOBS Act confers on issuers benefits that
are specific to domestic filings.60
Given the relief described above, Title I of the JOBS Act should have
some positive impact in stimulating IPO activity in the United States, as it
creates an attractive status that companies can enjoy for roughly five years.
The issue remains, though, as to whether that impact will be significant
enough to stem the tide of decreasing IPO activity in the United States.
At the time this paper was drafted, a small sample of data was availa-
ble regarding IPO activity since the passage of the JOBS Act. These studies
admit that they are unable to isolate the extent to which IPO activity has
been driven by the JOBS Act, but they do provide an initial glimpse after
one year of the JOBS Act. On the whole, IPO activity in the first year after
the Act’s passage was slightly up from the prior year.61 Additionally,
eighty-three percent of the companies that conducted an IPO in the first
year of the JOBS Act were EGCs.62 The fact that companies are using the
EGC status, however, does not necessarily mean that the availability of
such a status is what is pushing them into the IPO market. In fact, the
amount of companies going public in 2012 that had annual revenues under
$1 billion (the revenue limit for EGCs) was 113, while in 2011 that same
number was 114.63 Thus, while companies are taking advantage of EGC
status, and commentators are finding that EGC status may have “meaning-
fully improved and reduced the cost of the IPO process,” it is unclear what
effect these provisions are having in driving the number of IPOs.64
On June 8, 2012, shortly after the passage of the JOBS Act, at a meet-
ing of the Advisory Committee on Small and Emerging Companies, Jen-
58. Id. at §§ 105(b)–(d).
59. Id. at § 106(a).
60. See Generally Applicable Questions on Title I of the JOBS Act, SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, quests. 8–10 (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjjob-
sactfaq-title-i-general.htm (stating that if a foreign issuer qualifies for EGC status and chooses to
take advantage of the benefits EGCs are entitled to, the SEC will not object to the issuer comply-
ing with the same disclosure provisions as domestic EGCs, even though some of the reporting
forms differ).
61. Martin Wellington & Sarah Solum, On its One-Year Anniversary, Two Cheers for the
JOBS Act, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2013) http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/28/on-its-one-
year-anniversary-two-cheers-for-the-jobs-act/; ERNST & YOUNG, THE JOBS ACT: ONE-YEAR AN-
NIVERSARY 3 (2013), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/The_JOBS_
Act:_One-year_anniversary/$FILE/JOBSActAnniversary_CC0368_9April2013.pdf.
62. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 61, at 4.
63. Id. at 3.
64. Wellington & Solum, supra note 61.
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nifer Zepralka of the SEC stated that the Commission had received “about
30” confidential submissions of draft registration statements in the initial
two months after the bill was signed.65 It was a hopeful piece of anecdotal
data, indicating that issuers were at least showing interest in the draft regis-
tration statement provisions.
A separate contributor to the Advisory Committee on Small and
Emerging Companies had a less enthusiastic, though not negative, review
of Title I of the JOBS Act. Gregory Yadley is a Florida securities attorney
who said that as of the meeting on June 8, 2012, he had not seen a great
difference in the level of interest in conducting an IPO.66 He explained
“[t]his is not a negative reaction. I think it’s just, wow, there’s a lot going
on, it’s pretty complicated. What’s really different?”67
Mr. Yadley’s sentiment has been echoed in the initial scholarly re-
views of the JOBS Act. Zachary Gubler of Arizona State University claims
that the public securities market in the United States has been and continues
to be “dysfunctional.”68 Gubler called the JOBS Act “puzzling,” in that its
“deregulatory agenda” did not focus so much on reforming public mar-
kets—perhaps through rolling back a greater portion of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act—but instead on deregulating private markets.69 Reflecting his conclu-
sion that the JOBS Act did not mark any significant improvement to the
IPO market, Gubler states the following:
The dysfunctional IPO market creates pressure to either reform
the public market or expand the private one. Just as the SEC has
done for the past decade, Congress decided to expand the private
securities market with the JOBS Act because this alternative of-
fers greater political slack and avoids the uncertainty that accom-
panies any attempt at diagnosing and solving the underlying
problem with the public market.70
Gubler clearly thinks that the public market received no help from the
JOBS Act.
In regards to the EGC provisions of Title I of the JOBS Act, Adam
Pritchard of the University of Michigan Law School asserts that “these pro-
visions of the JOBS Act are far from revolutionary.”71 Shortly after the
passage of the JOBS Act, Pritchard advocated giving issuers more choice
65. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Transcript of Fourth Meeting of Advisory
Committee on Small and Emerging Companies 6 (June 8, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/
info/smallbus/acsec/acsec060812-transcript.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee Meeting].
66. See id.; See also Gregory C. Yadley, SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK, LLP, http://www.
slk-law.com/Lawyers/Gregory-C-Yadley (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (describing biographic infor-
mation and work experience for Gregory C. Yadley).
67. Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 65, at 9.
68. Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 745, 796 (2013).
69. Id. at 795.
70. Id. at 796.
71. Pritchard, supra note 2, at 1011.
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over whether to operate as a private or public company.72 Under his
scheme, issuers would be eligible for public company status based on cer-
tain quantitative benchmarks, but the decision to go public would be volun-
tary and rest with the issuer.73 Though Pritchard’s paper chiefly outlined his
proposed alternative reporting regime, he commented briefly on the JOBS
Act saying that although it “pushed back” some of the qualifying lines that
require a company to comply with public company status, overall it
“fail[ed] to address the fundamental inefficiency of the market for IPOs.”74
While I am intrigued by Pritchard’s proposal to make the reporting
regime semi-elective, my own conclusion regarding Title I of the JOBS Act
is that it could have been far more effective even without the fundamental
changes suggested by Pritchard. With just a few minor tweaks from the
final form of the bill, the Act could have been far more effective in generat-
ing IPO activity than it is projected by many to be. First, the Title I should
not have limited a company’s ability to enjoy EGC status to only five
years.75 This creates uncertainty for an issuer considering whether to go
public because the issuer has to consider significant and uncertain reporting
requirements it will face five years down the road, even if its business has
not grown quickly enough to absorb the associated costs of such reporting.
Second, Title I should have given relief to issuers that went public before
December 8, 2011.76 Excluding such companies from EGC status shrinks
the pool of eligible issuers that could enjoy less stringent reporting require-
ments, and with that, enjoy greater flexibility to spur growth.
Title I of the JOBS Act in effect created an intermediate status be-
tween public companies and private companies when it created the Emerg-
ing Growth Company definition. In this sense, it attempted to veer away
from the “one-size-fits-all” approach criticized by Representative Fincher.77
While it is debatable whether the size of a company’s shareholder roster is a
relevant factor for determining whether a company should be considered
“public,”78 the EGC status did indeed attempt to provide relief and flexibil-
ity to smaller companies, which was one of the legislative concerns dis-
cussed above.79 However, while companies qualify for EGC status based on
size, they may nonetheless be disqualified from this status based on the
duration of time for which they are an EGC. This creates incongruence in
72. Adam C. Pritchard, Facebook, the JOBS Act, and Abolishing IPOs, REGULATION, Fall
2012, at 12, 15–17, available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/
2012/11/v35n3-3.pdf.
73. Id. at 15–16.
74. Id. at 15.
75. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at §§ 101(a)–(b).
76. Id. at § 101(d).
77. See 157 CONG. REC. supra note 31, at E2210–11.
78. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Se-
curities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 340–41 (2013) (arguing that a com-
pany’s trading volume is a more appropriate metric for determining “publicness”).
79. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
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the criteria that an issuer has to consider in determining whether or not to
conduct an IPO. Thus, while an EGC incurs lower expenses connected to
the initial public offering of its securities and fewer expenses in complying
with subsequent disclosure requirements once public, it is guaranteed to
face a more expensive reporting regime five years down the road, regardless
of its size at the time. Companies making the decision to go public are thus
not only forced to look at current revenues and revenue projections for the
near future, but they must also project revenue for years six and beyond,
and forecast that against a more expensive reporting regime.
One such expense is the previously discussed internal controls reports
of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404. Bainbridge reports that to become compli-
ant with Section 404, large firms spent an average of $7.3 million in year
one, while smaller public firms spent an average of $1.6 million in year
one.80 Thus, an EGC deciding to go public must account for the expense of
the internal controls, not knowing exactly when they will incur the expense,
how expensive it will be, or whether the company will have the revenues to
afford that expense while continuing to grow its business. If the EGC status
were based solely on size, an issuer would only be exposed to the expense
of the internal controls report once it was correspondingly bringing in a
larger amount of revenue (or whatever other quantitative benchmark is es-
tablished to define a company as “public”). Such a regime would give issu-
ers greater certainty and predictability as they strategize as to how they will
raise capital. Whether it is a foreign firm considering US markets or a US
company contemplating when to go public, certainty and predictability of
cost will make that issuer more likely to choose the US IPO market as its
next capital raising venue.
The second simple, but significant, failure I see in Title I is that EGC
status is only available to issuers who go public after December 8, 2011.
Thus, a small public company’s ability to grow, absent the burdens and
expenses previously discussed, arbitrarily depends on when it first chose to
go public.81 Admittedly, the emphasis of Title I is to encourage IPO activ-
ity, and companies who went public before the introduction of this Act are
not likely to be conducting an IPO again anytime soon,82 but the ongoing
benefits to EGCs are still noteworthy and could have been beneficial to
other smaller issuers. Opening up EGC status to issuers who went public
before December 8, 2011, would not only satisfy notions of fairness, but it
would also reduce regulatory compliance costs for small companies,
thereby increasing profits and giving them opportunities to grow their busi-
nesses and their workforces.
80. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 9, at 8–9.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
82. The exception to this is that, if a company is able, it could cause itself to become private,
only to later use the EGC status to go public again through an IPO.
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There are attractive benefits attendant to Emerging Growth Company
status, but similar to Pritchard and Gubler, I do not see Title I as creating a
fundamental change that will encourage more frequent IPO activity in the
United States. While the benefits to EGC status are noteworthy, the road-
blocks to attaining and/or retaining that status will likely stifle the potential
effectiveness of Title I.
B. Title II: Access to Capital for Job Creators
If Title I was the political rallying point that largely unified lawmakers
behind the cause of jump-starting IPO activity, the private offering reforms
under Title II caused a political firestorm that has drawn spirited input from
investor advocates, business interests, the SEC, and JOBS Act advocates in
the legislature. Title II is much simpler in form, but it has been as contro-
versial, if not more controversial, than any other part of the Act. Much in
the way that Title I created a blurry line between public company status and
private company status through adoption of the Emerging Growth Company
definition, Title II creates a blurry line between public offers and private
offers. Title II allows for the use of general solicitation and general adver-
tising in the context of Rule 506 offerings and Rule 144A offerings, yet
such offers are still considered “private.”83
Title II of the JOBS Act required rule-making by the SEC, and on
August 29, 2012, it put forth a release with a proposed SEC rule on general
solicitation and general advertising.84 Thereafter, the SEC received exten-
sive and impassioned commentary from the public. Title II contains two
key components: first, it authorizes issuers to generally solicit and generally
advertise even in private offers, and second, it places an attendant obliga-
tion upon issuers to verify that persons receiving private offers are accred-
ited investors.
In Rule 506 offerings, issuers can sell their securities to an unlimited
number of “accredited investor[s]” without the offer being considered a
public offer.85 However, until passage of the JOBS Act, they could not re-
cruit investors through “any form of general solicitation or general advertis-
ing.”86 Title II of the JOBS Act required the SEC to remove this ban on the
use of general solicitation or general advertising in Rule 506 offerings.87
The flip side of the issuer’s newfound ability to solicit or advertise, how-
83. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 201(a).
84. Proposed Rule Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Ad-
vertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33,9354, 77 Fed. Reg.
54,464 (proposed Aug. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Rule on General Solicitation].
85. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b), 230.501(e).
86. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b), 230.502(c); see also JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 201(a)(1).
87. JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 201(a)(1).
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ever, is that such issuers must “take reasonable steps to verify that purchas-
ers of the securities are accredited investors.”88
Previously, issuers participating in Rule 506 offerings only had to have
a “reasonab[le] belie[f]” that the purchasers were accredited investors.89
The SEC’s final rule—released just prior to this article going for publica-
tion—allows issuers to continue to conduct offerings that do not make use
of general solicitation (under Rule 506(b)), while only subjecting issuers to
the “reasonable belief” standard.90
Secondly, Title II removes the ban on general solicitation and advertis-
ing in the context of Rule 144A offerings.91 While securities sold in the US
private markets typically have restrictions on when they can be resold,
144A offerings allow for the immediate resale, as long as that resale is to
certain institutional buyers.92 Because there is not a time restriction on
when the purchaser is allowed to resell the securities, the issuer of the se-
curities gets a better price when it first sells the securities.93 Rule 144A
offerings have become an extremely popular way for companies to raise
capital, and are particularly attractive to foreign issuers because—as “pri-
vate” offerings—the issuer can avoid the public company reporting scheme
of the United States.94 Under the JOBS Act amendments, sellers in Rule
144A offerings can now use general solicitation and general advertising,
provided they have a reasonable belief that the purchaser of the securities is
an accredited investor.95
After releasing the Proposed Rule on General Solicitation and General
Advertising, the SEC allowed for the common practice of accepting public
commentary on the proposed rule. As mentioned, the SEC received much
commentary on the proposed rules regarding general solicitation and gen-
eral advertising. The views have varied widely between a diversity of inter-
est groups, and the following provides only a small sample of the responses.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b), 230.501(a) (emphasis added).
90. Proposed Rule on General Solicitation, supra note 84, at 54,467 (stating that issuers who
do not wish to make use of general solicitation will not “become subject to the new requirement to
take reasonable steps to verify the accredited investor status of purchasers”); see also Eliminating
the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33,9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,72 (July 10, 2013) [hereinafter
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation].
91. JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 201(a)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(1) (2013).
92. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV.
409, 410–11 (2008); see also SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N. SEC Final Rule: Resale of Restricted
Securities; Changes to Method of Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities Under
Rules 144 and 145, 55 Fed. Reg. 17933–01 (Apr. 30, 1990) (stating that resale of securities to
“qualified institutional buyers” are exempt from the registration requirement of the Securities Act
of 1933).
93. Sjostrom, supra note 92, at 411.
94. Id.
95. JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 201(a)(2).
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The Angel Capital Association (ACA) submitted a comment to the
SEC that was in part praiseworthy, and in part critical, of the SEC’s pro-
posed rule.96 Notably, it praised the SEC for maintaining Rule 506(b) in its
current form, as this allowed for uninterrupted practice of Rule 506 offers
that do not involve general solicitations.97 The ACA continued, “[t]his sup-
ports the continued flow of capital for many job-creating startups, as was
the intent of the JOBS Act.”98 The ACA’s critique of the proposed rule was
that it thought the SEC should have put forth more guidance regarding what
constitutes “reasonable steps to verify” whether an investor is indeed ac-
credited.99 Although the SEC provided factors that would be relevant in
determining what constitutes “reasonable steps to verify,”100 the ACA com-
ment suggested that the SEC should have created specific safe harbors so
that if companies took particular steps, they could be assured that they had
adequately verified the investor’s status.101 The ACA expressed concern
that the “current proposed rules will lead to confusion and cause legal advi-
sors to issuers to insist on complex and burdensome forms and submissions
that will cause many angels to back away from this essential asset class.”102
Another comment came from the Council of Institutional Investors
(CII) which also expressed concern over the SEC’s “failure to specify the
verification methods” by which an issuer must ensure that an investor is
accredited.103 Additionally, the CII noted that the definition of an accredited
investor—which for natural persons is based on having an income of
$200,000 or a net worth of $1,000,000—is itself antiquated and based on
quantitative thresholds established in the early 1980s.104 Given that the fi-
nancial thresholds to reach accredited status are rather attainable for natural
persons, the CII thought the SEC’s failure to put forth “strong safeguards”
to ensure accredited status is likely to lead to more fraudulent activity.105
The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.
(NASAA) is a group of “state securities regulators who work closely with
small businesses in their capital formation efforts,” and it also submitted a
96. Letter from Marianne Hudson, Exec. Dir., Angel Capital Ass’n to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Sept. 27, 2012), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-
72.pdf [hereinafter ACA Comment].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Proposed Rule on General Solicitation, supra note 84, at 54,467–71.
101. ACA Comment, supra note 96.
102. Id.
103. Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n at 2 (Sept. 27, 2012), http://sec.gov/comments/
s7-07-12/s70712-74.pdf [hereinafter CII Comment].
104. See id. at 3 (as a slight correction of the Council of Institutional Investors comment, an
accredited investor is a natural person with a $200,000 annual income ($300,000 for married
couples) or a net worth of $1,000,000). 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5), (6) (2013).
105. CII Comment, supra note 103, at 3.
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comment regarding the proposed rule.106 In its comment letter, the NASAA
said it was “greatly disappointed” with the Rule 506 changes.107 It felt that
the SEC could have implemented the Rule 506 changes in a manner that
was faithful to the intent of Congress, but would have provided much
greater investor protection.108 Primarily, the NASAA advocated for a rule
that would require an issuer to make a regulatory filing before it engaged in
any type of general solicitation or advertisement, as opposed to the current
rule which requires issuers to make the filing fifteen days after the first
sale.109 Such a rule would put the burden on issuers to become compliant
with SEC rules before advertising to investors, while the current rule places
risk on the investor prior to the issuer certifying its compliance with SEC
solicitation and advertising rules. The NASAA, similar to the ACA and the
CII, also argued that the SEC should have provided specific “non-exclusive
safe harbors for the verification of accredited investors.”110
Conversely, the prominent New York City law firm of Sullivan &
Cromwell submitted a comment to the SEC in which it largely praised the
proposed rule.111 In particular, it approved of the Commission’s decision to
apply a “facts and circumstances” standard to determine whether issuers
took reasonable steps to verify an investor’s status, as opposed to prescrib-
ing specific verification methods.112 The law firm argued that the set of
factors that the SEC put forward in its proposing release provided “a flexi-
ble and practical framework.”113 The firm argued, in opposition to the
above groups, that “prescribed verification methods would be overly bur-
densome in some cases, while ineffective in others.”114
After a lengthy period in which it accepted public commentary, the
SEC in its final rule decided to create a series of safe harbor provisions that
would satisfy an issuer’s duty to take reasonable steps to verify accredited
investor status.115 The safe harbors will apply in four circumstances: where
the issuer has gathered certain IRS documents of the investor; where the
issuer has determined the net worth of an investor through the use of spe-
106. Letter from A. Heath Abshure, President, North American Sec. Adm’ Ass’n, Inc., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, at 1 (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.sec.
gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-92.pdf.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Id. at 3–5 (discussing the requirements for Form D submissions).
110. Id. at 5.
111. See generally Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 5, 2012) (expressing approval and agreement with various
approaches taken by the SEC), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-115.pdf.
112. Id. at 2.
113. Id.
114. Id. (listing some of the relevant factors put forward by the SEC: “nature of the purchaser,
information about the purchaser available to the issuer and the nature and terms of the offering,
and [ ] the interconnectivity of these factors”).
115. Proposed Rule on General Solicitation, supra note 84 at 54,467.
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cific documents, including, but not limited to bank statements or brokerage
account statements; where certain professionals, including, but not limited
to, investment advisers, accountants, or attorneys, can confirm that a person
is an accredited investor; and lastly, where a person has previously invested
with the issuer under Rule 506 as an accredited investor and the person can
confirm that he or she is still an accredited investor.116 These safe harbors
are in addition to the “principles-based” method of verification from the
proposed release,117 and thus, the SEC forged a compromise between the
above-mentioned parties that submitted commentary to the SEC. The ac-
credited investor verification methods are relevant to capital market com-
petitiveness because the perceived level of investor protection within a
particular market can affect where an investor will bring his or her capital.
Some investor advocates, such as the ACA, argue that the lack of clarity in
the proposed verification rules will add costs to such an extent that angel
investors may back away from Rule 506 offerings.118 Relatedly, the SEC’s
proposing release acknowledged that a flexible verification standard could
lead to legal uncertainty and add cost to issuers and investors in the form of
litigation risk.119 The SEC also warned that regardless of what shape the
investor verification rules take, investor verification will add costs to the
private placement market and could therefore dampen its attractiveness.120
In its final rule on general solicitation and advertising, the SEC put forth a
solution that would remain flexible, but also set forth some predictable stan-
dards. This should assuage investor protection concerns without adding
costs and procedural layers to issuers conducting a Rule 506 offer.
The final form of Rule 506 makes an already strong private placement
market even stronger. With the ability to generally solicit and advertise,
issuers of securities have another tool in their belts, one that provides a
means to offer securities without having to register as a public company.
Given that “accredited investor” quantitative benchmarks for natural per-
sons have not changed for thirty years,121 in conjunction with the ability to
generally advertise and solicit, issuers will have a continually growing mar-
ket of potential investors that can participate in private offerings. Addition-
ally, the SEC exercised sound judgment by maintaining Rule 506(b)
offerings as they have traditionally been executed, thus not requiring issuers
to verify whether an investor is accredited if the issuer does not generally
advertise or solicit.122 This should prevent interruptions for issuers and in-
vestors who already have successful investment relationships established.
116. Id. at 54,468–69.
117. Id. at 54,469.
118. See ACA Comment, supra note 96.
119. See id.
120. See Proposed Rule on General Solicitation, supra note 84, at 54,478.
121. See CII Comment, supra note 103, at 3.
122. See Proposed Rule on General Solicitation, supra note 84, at 54,467.
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These groups can choose to avoid altogether offerings that make use of
general solicitation, or can enter the market at a later date as the offering
process is refined and made more efficient.
The demand for efficiency is what drives the private offering market.
Issuers want to raise large amounts of capital quickly and with low costs.
Today, the private offering market in the United States is an increasingly
powerful source of capital for corporations.123 Consider the following from
the SEC’s proposed release on the general solicitation rules:
In 2011, the estimated amount of capital (including both equity
and debt) raised in Rule 506 offerings and Rule 144A offerings
was $895 billion and $168 billion, respectively, compared to $984
billion raised in registered offerings. In 2010, the estimated
amount of capital (including both equity and debt) raised in Rule
506 offerings and Rule 144A offerings was $902 billion and $233
billion, respectively, compared to $1.07 trillion raised in regis-
tered offerings. These data points underscore the importance of
the Rule 506 and Rule 144A exemptions for issuers seeking ac-
cess to the U.S. capital markets.124
With a private offering market roughly the same size as the public offering
market, and the main provision of Title II of the JOBS Act allowing general
solicitation and advertising in two already popular markets, the widespread
participation in private markets should continue to grow. This will bolster
the size of US capital markets on the whole. However, Title II detracts from
the broader goal of promoting more IPO activity. Both foreign and domes-
tic issuers, having been given the freedom to generally solicit and advertise,
will have increased access to capital without having to conduct a public
offering. In turn, they will likely take advantage of this capital instead of
subjecting themselves to the costs of an IPO and the disclosure obligations
attendant to public company status.
C. Title V: Private Company Flexibility and Growth
Lest the private markets needed any more help, the JOBS Act incorpo-
rated Title V, bearing the name “Private Company Flexibility and
Growth.”125 Like the IPO provisions in Title I, Title V was effective imme-
diately; however, unlike Title I, Title V is concise and straightforward. Title
V amends section 12(g)(1)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act to read that
an issuer will be required to register as a public company when it has a class
of securities held of record by at least 2,000 persons, or 500 persons who
are not accredited investors.126 Previously, an issuer was required to register
123. See Measure 7 – Relative Size of the Private Rule 144A and Public Equity Markets,
supra note 27.
124. Proposed Rule on General Solicitation, supra note 84, at 54,465–66.
125. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at Title V.
126. See id. at § 501; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (2012).
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its securities once it reached 500 investors, regardless of whether or not the
investors were accredited.127 Now, a company can expand its investor base
by as much as 1,500 investors (so long as 1,500 of the total investors are
accredited) without having to file as a public company. Most notably in
regard to section 12(g)(1)(A) is that the shareholder threshold refers to the
number of shareholders “of record.”128 As Pritchard describes, “if broker-
dealers held the shares on the company’s record books as nominees for their
customers, companies could have thousands of beneficial owners hidden
beneath a record shareholder number that remained under 500.”129 With
that 500 shareholders of record limit now raised to 2,000 shareholders of
record, the effect that Pritchard describes is now compounded.
There is little professional commentary on this provision of the JOBS
Act, and those who have commented have found it to be of minimal signifi-
cance. This is primarily because of the shareholder “of record” distinction.
In regards to becoming public through the shareholder ceiling of section
12(g), scholars Donald Langevoort and Robert Thompson note: “While
roughly a size test, it is not really: as the Facebook example . . . show[s],
many extraordinarily large and powerful companies have few enough re-
cord shareholders to avoid registration.”130 Pritchard was also doubtful of
Title V’s impact, stating, “I question whether this is an important constraint
for companies smaller than Facebook that are striving to maintain their pri-
vate status. Data on this issue are simply not available.”131
Therefore, although the implication may be minimal for the majority
of companies considering public versus private status, the minimal impact
of the change nonetheless supports a company’s ability to stay private. For
example, Facebook’s COO said that her company would not have gone
public at the time it did if it had access to the 2,000 shareholder ceiling
instituted by Title V of the JOBS Act.132 Underscoring the increasing abil-
ity of US companies to remain private, it is remarkable that a company
whose worth was estimated at more than $82 billion just months before its
initial public offering133 could potentially have remained private if the
JOBS Act were enacted two years earlier.
127. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78l (2012) (describing in the annotations, under the section titled
“Amendments,” each amendment to Section 78l, including the text of § 78l(g)(1) as it appeared
prior to the 2012 amendments).
128. See JOBS Act, supra note 34, at § 501; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A) (2012).
129. Pritchard, supra note 2, at 1004.
130. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 78, at 355 (citing Robert C. Bartlett III, Going
Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms’ Going-Private
Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 11 (2009)).
131. Pritchard, supra note 2, at 1009.
132. Michelle Quinn & Jonathan Allen, Facebook: JOBS Act Would Have Affected IPO, PO-
LITICO (Apr. 6, 2012, 3:43 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/74918.html.
133. DEALBOOK, Tracking Facebook’s Valuation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012, 1:20 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/tracking-facebooks-valuation/.
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Similar to Title II, Title V gives issuers flexibility to stay private while
increasing their access to new capital. To the extent that this is a gain for
private companies, it is a loss for public markets. The impact of Title V
could be stratified because the increased shareholder ceiling coincides with
an issuer’s increased ability to find additional investors by means of general
advertising and solicitation. The JOBS Act provisions that collectively ben-
efit private markets will do so to the relative detriment of US public
markets.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the JOBS Act is likely
to improve the competitive position of US capital markets. Answered sim-
ply, I conclude that the JOBS Act is likely to bolster America’s capital
markets overall, particularly because it strengthens the already robust pri-
vate placement market. However, I do not think that the JOBS Act is likely
to be effective in achieving its stated purpose, which was, “[t]o increase
American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the
public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”134 Key to this
analysis is that while Title I of the JOBS Act might indeed make incremen-
tal steps to improve access to public markets, the remainder of the Act
promulgates more influential measures that will strengthen the private mar-
kets, and thereby give companies the flexibility and even the incentive to
remain private. This could nullify, or perhaps cause a net loss, to the rela-
tive strength of American public markets, despite gains the public markets
achieved through Emerging Growth Company definition in Title I of the
Act.
Limiting the availability of Emerging Growth Company status to
newly public companies, and the decision by Congress to limit that status to
a five-year period, regardless of size, are the major weaknesses in the JOBS
Act—at least in relation to its stated objective. The “on-ramp” in Title I
streamlines the IPO process and decreases reporting costs, causing issuers
to go public earlier than they might have otherwise. The limited duration of
their EGC status, however, should also incentivize them to wait, knowing
that they have to project whether they will be able to afford full public
company status five years later.135 And—as discussed throughout this pa-
per—these companies can more easily wait to conduct their IPOs, while
still having access to capital, because the remainder of the JOBS Act grants
flexibility and expansion of the investor pool for private offers.
134. See JOBS Act, supra note 34 (emphasis added).
135. For an illustration, if a company were to go public as an EGC when it had revenues of
$400,000,000, assuming 20% annual growth in each of the next five years, it would reach reve-
nues of $995,328,000 after five years. Thus, an EGC projecting relatively ambitious revenue
growth would have to wait to do its IPO until it surpasses $400,000,000 in annual revenue if it
wants to avoid being timed out of EGC status.
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American private placement markets are already extremely active, and
are only made more attractive to issuers through the Act. Under Title V, an
issuer can now quadruple its investor base in the US without having to
register its securities. Meanwhile, the general solicitation and general adver-
tising provisions in Title II provide an avenue by which issuers can seek out
accredited investors. The result is that both foreign and domestic issuers
have increased access to capital in the United States, which they can access
without absorbing the added costs of conducting an IPO or availing them-
selves to public company disclosure requirements. These provisions in tan-
dem frustrate the purpose in Title I, which is to encourage companies to tap
the public market.
The other key issue of the JOBS Act, which was not the focus of this
paper, is that it is a loss for investor protection advocates. In this paper I did
not endeavor to analyze the extent of the loss, but investor protection advo-
cates gain next to nothing in each of the Titles discussed. Title I allows for
less rigorous audit standards and less shareholder participation in corporate
governance issues. Title II adds wording that requires issuers to verify ac-
credited investor status, but this comes at the cost of issuers being able to
advertise and solicit the public, in furtherance of “private” offers. Finally,
Title V allows issuers to stay private for a longer period of time, and thus
not be required to make periodic disclosures to the public.
Some observers are justifiably apprehensive that investor protection
concerns will in fact lessen the attractiveness of US capital markets and
drive investors away. Though I accept this argument, I do not anticipate
investor protection shortcomings in the JOBS Act slowing down the wave
of issuers who want access to the rapidly growing American private place-
ment market. Whether or not the JOBS Act is prudent in regard to weighing
investor protection against attractiveness of American capital markets, I
leave for another to conclude. I do, however, anticipate that the Act will be
effective in driving more activity in the US private placement market. As
for the IPO on-ramp: I am skeptical that there will be traffic jams there any
time soon.
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